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Abstract—We propose a method to design a decentralized
energy market which guarantees individual rationality (IR) in
expectation, in the presence of system-level grid constraints.
We formulate the market as a welfare maximization problem
subject to IR constraints, and we make use of Lagrangian
duality to model the problem as a n-person non-cooperative
game with a unique generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE). We
provide a distributed algorithm which converges to the GNE.
The convergence and properties of the algorithm are investigated
by means of numerical simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivations
The scientific community agrees that in the future the intel-
ligent activation of demand response (DR) will contribute to
a reliable power system and price stability on power markets.
Actuation of DR requires to solve an optimization problem
in order to maximize an economic objective, which typically
results in a welfare maximization problem (WMP), in which
the unweighted sum of the economic costs of a group of
agents is minimized. A very similar, and perhaps more studied
problem, is the optimal power flow (OPF) problem. The OPF
is usually solved in a centralized way by an independent
system operator (ISO), in order to minimize the generation
cost of a group of distributed power plants, over the set of
underlying grid constraints. When the number of generators in-
creases, the problem could become computationally expensive.
Furthermore, retrieving all the generator-specific parameters
could become impractical for the ISOs. For these reasons,
different decentralized formulations of the OPF exist [1],
which can speed up the computation exploiting parallelization
among the different units. Furthermore, solving the problem
in a decentralized way allows the generators to keep most of
their information and parameters private, increasing privacy
and lowering cyber-security concerns. The main difference
between the OPF and DR setting, is that the second one
involves the participation of self-serving agents, which cannot
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be a-priori trusted by the ISOs. This implies that if an agent
find it profitable (in terms of its own economic utility), he
will compute a different optimization problem from the one
provided by the ISO. For this reason, some aspects of DR
formulations are better described through a game theoretic
framework.
B. Background and previous work
In this setting, we must consider that agents can adopt a
strategy si(θi), which can be in general different from the
one suggested by the ISO, based on their private information
(or type), denoted as θi, and their belief about the strategy of
the other prosumers. The well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) mechanism [2]–[4] belongs to the strategy-proof class
of mechanisms and presents other useful theoretical properties,
among which being weakly budget-balanced. Anyway, to
achieve this, it requires a value redistribution among agents
under the form of monetary taxation, such that the tax which
applies to agent i is directly or indirectly independent from
its actions. This implies that N optimization problems must
be solved, each of which is performed without considering
a given agent. This makes the computational cost quadratic
in N . Furthermore, VCGs are typically centralized and as
such, they do not preserve the privacy of the agents. For
example, in [5], a VCG mechanism for virtual inertia is
considered, in which bidders send their bidding curves to a
center, which solves N independent optimization problems.
Since the VCG mechanism guarantees that the best bidding
strategy is bidding truthfully, they send their true cost curves
ci(xi, λi) to the center. Note anyway that, if the agent’s
system presents some constraints, ci(xi, λi) must represent
them. This means that the center must know all the agent
constraint sets Xi in order to solve the VCG. The unfavorable
computational cost makes the VCG impractical for combina-
torial auctions [6] and problems with a large number of users
with a nontrivial objective function. Despite this and other
aspects which make it impractical in some cases [7], VCGs
have been extensively studied since they are the only general
purpose incentive compatible mechanisms which maximize
social welfare [8]. In order to preserve agent’s privacy, it is
possible to retrieve a distributed formulation of VCG using
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primal-dual decomposition algorithms. Note that distributing
the mechanism aggravates the scalability problem of VCG,
since the overall computation must now take into account com-
munication delays. A second effect of adopting a decentralized
formulation is that we cannot guarantee strategyproofness any-
more. This is known as the cost of decentralization [9], which
leads to a weaker notion of incentive compatibility, namely
ex-post Nash equilibrium (EPNE). Although weaker than a
dominant-strategy equilibrium, ex-post Nash equilibrium does
not require agents to model the strategies nor types of other
agents through belief functions, as it’s done using Bayes-Nash
equilibrium [10]. Following this concept, in [11] guidelines for
distributed implementations of VCG mechanisms are derived.
In [9] a distributed VCG mechanism which reuses part of
the computation done in each subproblem is presented. More
recently [12] has proposed a distributed VCG implementation
based on dual decomposition, and applied the concept of
multistage mechanism, in which different mechanisms are
applied at each primal dual update. Also in this case, the
proposed algorithm scales quadratically with the number of
agents. Another field of research, started with the seminal work
of Rosen on n-person non-cooperative games [13], adopt non-
VCG mechanisms to reach EPNE [14], [15]. This involves
allowing a loss in terms of efficiency [16], with the benefit of
better scalability with respect to the number of agents.
In this paper we propose a method to guarantee participation
constraint, also known as individual rationality (IR): all the
prosumers must have a positive return participating in the
proposed energy market, with respect to the base case. We
ensure IR allowing a coordinator to limit the Lagrangian
multipliers associated to the coupling constraints. The rest of
the paper is structured as follows: in II the specific problem
we address is formulated and we show that its associate game
mapping is monotone, which is a condition for the unique-
ness of the VGNE; in III we propose a new algorithm for
reaching the GNE, based on the alternating direction method
of multipliers (ADMM); in IV we compare the convergence
of the aforementioned algorithm with a recently proposed
[17] preconditioned forward backward (pFB) algorithm for
distributed Nash equilibrium seeking.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this work we are interested in a more general problem
with respect of the OPF. In particular, we consider the case
in which a group of agents which produce and/or consume
energy (prosumers now on) can sell their aggregated flexibility
to third parties, for example to DSO through demand response
programs or to balance responsible parties. The mathematical
formulation of this problem is known as the sharing problem:
argmin
x∈X
e(x) +
N∑
i
ci(xi)
s.t. Ax ≤ b
(1)
where X = ∏Ni=1 Xi is the Cartesian product of the
prosumers feasible sets, e(x) is a system level objective, ci(xi)
are the costs of each prosumers and the linear constraints
are affine coupling constraints between the prosumers and
x = [xT1 , ..x
T
N ] = [xi]
N
i=1 is the vector of the concatenated ac-
tions of all the prosumers. Here the affine coupling constraints
encode grid constraints, limiting voltage and power in a subset
of selected nodes of the grid in which the agents are located.
This is possible taking into account the linearized formulation
of the power flow equations [1], [18], whose coefficients can
be estimated using phasor measurement units [19], even using
smart meter data [20]. The advantage of considering coupling
constraints instead of agent-level constraints on voltage and
power is given by the fact that the first approach can reach
better solutions in terms of total welfare.
As anticipated in the introduction, we are interested in
decomposing problem (1) among the self interested prosumers,
in such a way that the induced game presents only one
variational GNE, and in the algorithms leading to such an
equilibrium. Being the equilibrium unique, rational agents will
converge to the EPGNE. This is equivalent to assume that the
agents believe their own influence on the prices broadcasted
by the sequence of mechanism proposed by the algorithm are
negligible, i.e. they are price takers.
A reasonable way to turn the centralized problem (1) into
a non-cooperative game, is to reward each prosumer with a
part of the system level objective e(x), based on the amount
of energy he produces or consumes during a give period of
time:
v(xi, x−i) = ci(xi) +
|xi|∑N
i=1|xi|
e(x) (2)
Anyway, this would result in a non-linear and non-convex
game. As a first approximation we can replace this repartition
rule with fixed (during each horizon) coefficients, based on a
moving average:
v(xi, x−i) = ci(xi) + αie(x) (3)
where
αi =
∑t
k=t−τ |xi,k|∑t
k=t−τ
∑N
i=1|xi,k|
(4)
Note that the game G(si(x), vi(x)) induced by the value
functions in (2) defines an aggregative game [21], in which
the each prosumer influence other’s prosumers value only by
means of the aggregated actions. The induced game can be
described as the set of optimization problems (5) in which
each prosumer minimizes its own value function v(xi, x−i)
and associated KKT conditions (6).{
min
xi∈Xi
v(xi, x−i)
s.t Ax ≤ b
∀i ∈ N (5)
KKT (i) =
{
0 ∈ ∂xivi(xi, x−i) + NXi +ATi λi
0 ≤ λi ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0
(6)
where AT =
[
ATi
]N
i=1
and NXi is the normal cone operator.
Before introducing the algorithms that can be used to solve 5,
we discuss some properties of the proposed objective function.
It is known that a sufficient condition for the existence and
uniqueness of a NE for a n-person non cooperative game is
that the system-level objective function σ(x) =
∑N
i=1 vi(xi) is
diagonally strictly convex [13]. In the case of affine coupling
constraints, authors in [22] and [23] have shown that the
game has a unique variational GNE if the pseudogradient of
σ(x), F : IRNT ⇒ IRNT = [∂xivi(xi)]i also known as game
mapping, is strictly monotone. Furthermore, the equilibrium
can be reached making the agents pay Aiλi, that is, the value
function of each agent coincides with the integral of the first
row of KKT in (6), v˜i = vi(xi, x−i)+λTAixi. In this case, it
has been shown that the agents reach a variational GNE with
unique Lagrangian multiplier λ. Note that the game mapping
differs from gradient of σ(x) since its components are the
partial derivatives of the values of the ith agent with respect
to its own actions. We now show that the game map generated
by the agents’ values defined in (2) inherits monotonicity from
the convexity of e(x).
Theorem II.1. Let e(x) : IRNT → IR be a (strictly/strongly)
convex function and let the costs of the agents ci(xi) : IRT →
I¯R be convex functions. Then any repartition [αi]
N
i=1 of e(x)
among the agents such that:
1) vi(xi, x−i) = αie(x) + ci(xi)
2) αi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ {N}
generates a (strictly/strongly) monotone game map F :
IRNT ⇒ IRNT
Proof. F = [∂xivi(xi, x−i)]Ni=1 can be seen as a sum
of two operators: E = [∂xiαie(xi, x−i)]Ni=1 and C =
[∂xici(xi)]
N
i=1. Due to the separability of C, it coincides with
the gradient of σ(x) =
∑N
i=1 ci(xi). Due to the convexity
of σ(x), C is a monotone map, since the gradient of a
convex function is monotone (theorem 1 in [24]). Using
the same reasoning, ∇xe(x) is a monotone map due to
the convexity of e(x). From the definition of monotonic-
ity, 〈x− y|∇xe(x)−∇ye(y)〉 ≥ 0 ∀ (x, y). Additionally,
since any convex function must be convex along any path, we
can state it component-wise: (xi − yi)(∂xie(x)− ∂yie(y)) ≥
0 ∀ (i ∈ {N}, x, y). Since we defined all αi as positive,
(xi−yi)αi(∂xie(x)−∂yie(y)) ≥ 0 ∀ (i ∈ {N}, x, y). Thus
〈x− y|E(x)− E(y)〉 ≥ 0 ∀ (x, y), and F is monotone
being the sum of two monotone operators.
III. ALGORITHMS FOR GNE SEEKING
As demonstrated in [23], asysmmetric projection algorithms
[25] can be used to reach a GNE of an aggregative game
with quadratic utilities. Recently, the same algorithm has been
rigorously derived modeling the GNE as a monotone inclusion
[17], showing that it coincides with a preconditioned forward
backward (pFB) method (algorithm (1)), which is a special
case of the Banach-Picard iteration [26] of two operators
whose sum is the set value mapping associated to the KKT
conditions in (6).
Algorithm 1 pFB
xk+1 = ΠX
[
xk − α(F(xk) +Atλk))]
λk+1 = ΠIR+
[
λk + β(2Axk+1 −Axk − b)]
We compare algorithm (1) with a trivial modification of the
ADMM algorithm [27], which convergence rate and properties
have been extensively studied in the literature. For clarity of
exposition, we start considering the version of problem (1)
without coupling constraints. This can be solved in a central-
ized way through ADMM, applying the procedure in [27] §7.3,
which results in the following parallelized formulation:
Algorithm 2 ADMM
xk+1i = argmin
xi∈Xi
ci(xi) +
αi
2ρ
‖(Sxk − yk)/N
− xki + xi + λk‖22
+
1
2ρ
‖(Axk − yk)/N −Aixki + xi + λka‖22 (7)
yk+1 = argmin
y
e(y) +
1
2ρ
‖y − Sxk+1 − λk‖ (8)
λk+1 = λk + Sxk+1 − yk+1 (9)
yk+1a = argmin
y
IXa +
1
2ρ
‖ya −Axk+1 − λk‖ (10)
λk+1a = λ
k
a +Ax
k+1 − yk+1a (11)
where the only difference form the centralized algorithm is
the αi coefficient in the xi update. We can write the KKT
conditions at convergence

∂xici(x
∗
i ) + αi
λ∗
ρ
+ATi
λ∗a
ρ
+ NXi = 0 ∀i ∈ N (12a)
∂ye(y
∗)− λ
∗
ρ
= 0 (12b)
y∗ = Sx∗ (12c)
0 ≤ λ∗a ⊥ −(Ax− b) ≥ 0 (12d)
We can find λ∗ from 12b and substitute it in 12a:
∂xici(x
∗
i ) + αi∂ye(y
∗) +ATi
λ∗a
ρ
+ NXi = 0 (13)
then we can use 12c, and recalling that S is the summation
matrix, we obtain:
∂xici(x
∗
i ) + αi∂xie(x
∗) +ATi
λ∗a
ρ
+ NXi = 0 (14)
which, together with 12d are equivalent to the KKT 6 of the
game 5, when vi = ci(xi) + αie(x).
A. Pricing and individual rationality
In this paper we only consider the case in which the function
e(x) is the surplus that the agent community has in paying the
energy at the point of common coupling with the electrical
grid:
e(x) = c
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
−
N∑
i=1
c(xi) (15)
where xi ∈ IRT is the vector of total power of the ith agent,
c(·) is the energy cost function defined as:
c(zt) =
{
pb,tzt, if zt ≥ 0
ps,tzt, otherwise
(16)
where pb,t and ps,t are the buying and selling tariffs, re-
spectively, at time t. In order to induce agents to follow the
proposed mechanism, we must ensure that the energy tariff
they pay participating in the market is always lower than the
one they pay in the base case. This is always true when we are
not taking into account grid constraints, since e(x) as defined
in (15) is always non-negative, when pb,t ≥ ps,t, as usual in
energy tariffs. However, if the agents are located in a grid with
big voltage oscillations, the Lagrangian dual variables (which
we can interpret as punishment prices) could be such that the
cost paid by the agents is higher than αie(x). To ensure IR,
we encode it in the optimization scheme. At each iteration, for
each time step in the horizon, we increment the Lagrangians
only if the following condition holds:
αie(x
k
t ) +A
T
i λ
k
t ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T (17)
where a negative value means that the prosumer is gaining a
reward. This obviously results in the impossibility to satisfy
the coupling constraints. We can give the following straightfor-
ward economic interpretation to this mechanism: each agent
would opt-out from the game as soon as the energy tariffs
become unfavorable with respect to the existing one. Condition
(17) prevent this from happening. In the presence of bad
power quality, the DSO could provide favorable energy tariffs
to prosumers participating in the mechanism, ensuring that
condition (17) is met with high probability.
B. Prosumers problem formulation
In this paper, each prosumer’s flexibility is modeled using
an electric battery. Although simple, the model we used is
not simplistic and we briefly describe it in this subsection.
Since the effect of charging or discharging on the state of
charge is not symmetric due to the efficiencies, the problem is
usually formulated as a mixed integer linear program (MILP),
introducing binary decision variables and using bilinear con-
straints, to avoid the simultaneous charge and discharge of
the battery. Furthermore, the objective function of the agents
is non differentiable at Pm = 0 and is mathematically
described by the maximum operator. In order to speed up the
computations, we reformulated all the control problems as a
quadratic optimization.
We start considering that both the ADMM and the pFB
formulations can be described by the following optimization
problem:
argmin
xi∈Xi
f(xi, x−i) +
1
2ρ
‖Dxi − rk‖22 (18)
where r is a reference signal and D ∈ IRT×2T = IT ⊗
[1,−1], performs the sum of the charging and discharging
operations with appropriate signs. Here, with abuse of no-
tation, we redefined the vector xi ∈ IR2T as the vector
containing both the charging and discharging operators, in
such a way that xi = [Pin,t;Pout,t]Tt=1, where Pin,t and Pout,t
are the charging and discharging powers of the battery. For the
ADMM formulation, it is easy to see that problem (18) can
be used to solve (7). We can still use (18) for solving the
pFB formulation recalling that the projected gradient descent
is equivalent to a quadratic optimization problem in the form:
argmin
xi∈Xi
(Fi(xki ) +Atiλk)T xi + 12ρ‖xi − xki ‖22 (19)
The battery is modeled as a discrete linear system, with the
state of charge denoted by s:
si,t+1 = As,isi,t +Bs,ixi,t (20)
We can eliminate the dependence on the state of the optimiza-
tion problem, using the standard batch formulation:
si = Λsi,0 + Γxi (21)
where xi ∈ IR2T×1 is the control vector for the whole time
horizon T and Λ ∈ IRT×1,Γ ∈ IRT×2T are the batch matrices.
We can now describe the set Xi through the linear con-
straints Acixi ≤ bci , defined as:
Aci =

I
I
−Γ
Γ
 bci =

xmin
xmax
−emin + Λe0
emax − Λe0
 (22)
where xmin, xmax, emin, emax ∈ IR2T are the power and
energy box constraints, while I is the identity matrix of
appropriate dimensions. Now we can reformulate the non
differentiable cost function (16) with a linear function, such
as we can reuse it in both the ADMM and pFB formulations.
We start considering that the if condition of the cost function
in (16) can be equivalently formulated using the max operator.
In turn, the max operator can be replaced by the sum of an
auxiliary variable y and appropriate inequality constraints. We
augment our decision variable such as x˜ = [xT , yT ]T . Now
the minimization of (16) is equal to the following optimization
problem:
min
x˜
lT x˜
s.t. : A˜x˜ ≤ b˜
(23)
where A˜ = [Ac,i;Ay] and b˜ = [bc,i, by], and
Ay =
[
D ◦ Pb − IT
D ◦ Ps − IT
]
by =
[−pbPm
−psPm
]
(24)
where the Pb, Ps ∈ IRT×2T tth rows entries are identical
to the buying and selling prices at time t. The effect of the
matrices in (24) is that the new auxiliary variable y is now an
upper envelope for the cost function (16). Since we require the
cost to be minimized, y will coincide with the cost function
c(·) at optimality. We can now use Ay and by in both the
ADMM and pFB formulations. While in the first lTxi replaces
f(xi, x−i) in (18), in the latter the prosumers’ energy costs
are considered as part of the pseudogradient: Fi = l+∂xie(x).
This problem formulation prevent us from introducing bi-
nary variables for the charging and discharging powers, since
optimal solutions of (23) does not require to simultaneously
charge and discharge the battery at the same time. This is
not true for the ADMM formulation, in which the quadratic
penalty on the sum of Pin,t and Pout,t with respect to a ref-
erence signal rk is present. In the case in which the reference
signal rk is negative, the battery is not only incentivized to
charge itself, but to consume as much energy as possible.
This will result in a simultaneous charge and discharge, due
to the round-trip efficiency. To avoid this behavior, f(·) can
be augmented with a linear therm, punishing the battery dis-
charging operation when r is negative: f˜(x˜i) = f(x˜i) + lTp x˜i
where lp ∈ IR1×3∗T has non zero entries, all identical to a
punishment therms, only when r < 0.
IV. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS
We test both the ADMM and the pFB and compare the
performance to a centralized solution. The only difference
from the ADMM and the centralized formulation are the
αi coefficients in equation (7), which are not present in the
centralized solution. Since the system-level objective function
e(x), as defined in (15), is not differentiable in 0 and is not
strictly nor strongly convex, the convergence of pFB is not
guaranteed. To have an equal comparison, we replaced the
system-level cost function (16) with a continuously differen-
tiable function. We define it by means of its derivative:
∇z c˜(z) = (pb,t − ps,t) tanh(kSxt) + 1
2
+ ps,t (25)
where k regulates the steepness of the function in z = 0. In
our simulations k = 10, which provides a reasonable steepness
for all the possible values of the power aggregate, since
we did all the computations in per units, and the aggregate
power constraint is Sx ∈ [−1.1, 1.1]. We stress out that this
approximation is only used for the system-level objective, and
not for the prosumers objective functions, where the cost (16)
is modeled as described in subsection III-B. In order to fairly
compare the algorithms, we used an equal stepsize ρ, fixed
to 0.1. The power profiles of each prosumer are randomly
chosen from a yearly dataset of real residential electrical
consumption. Each prosumer is equipped with a PV field, with
a nominal power uniformly distributed between 2 and 10 times
its daily energy consumption. Furthermore, each prosumer
is provided with an electric battery with size equal to the
expected daily energy exceeding its consumption. Figure 1
shows the optimized time series from a single case. In the
upper panel, the batteries’ state of charge (SOC) are shown.
Since the SOC is the time integral of the optimization variables
(Pin, Pout), it is clear that the ADMM and the pFB converged
exactly to the same solution. The middle panels shows the
forecasted aggregated power profile and the optimized one.
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pFB
Fig. 1. Time series example, N = 10. Blue: forecasted profiles. Red:
constraints. Grays: solutions of the centralized and decentralized approaches.
Top: state of charge for each battery. Middle: power profiles. Bottom: voltage
profiles.
Note that both the ADMM and pFB solutions are not far from
the centralized solution, while differences are more evident in
terms of single prosumers SOC. The last panel shows voltage
profiles at the point of common coupling. In figure 2 the
convergence of the two algorithms is shown, in terms of game
objective function σ(x). We ran a total of 50 simulations,
each of which includes 10 prosumers with power profiles and
battery sizes randomly chosen, as explained before. For each
simulation s, we retrieve the best optimal value of σ(x), psbest,
defined as:
psbest = minimum {p∗sADMM , p∗spFB} (26)
where p∗sADMM , p
∗s
pFB are the solution of the two algorithms
after 200 iterations (after which the relative change in σ(x)
for all the simulations was smaller than 1e − 5). The thick
lines show the median, while the shadowed patches contain
half of the simulations.
0 50 100 150 200
iterations [-]
0
0.05
0.1
 
p n*
 
[-]
ADMM
dFB
Fig. 2. Normalized optimal value p∗. The thick lines denote the median,
while the shaded areas are the 25% and 75% quantiles.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a method to enforce IR while reaching
a EPGNE in a distributed way. The method and the related
algorithm have been tested, and compared with pFB, a state
of the art algorithm for GNE seeking. The simulations shows
that the proposed algorithm reaches the same solutions of pFB,
while showing faster convergence in most of the cases. In
future research, we will extensively investigate the advantages
of the proposed methodology.
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